	EC3JWASC	Conference	
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW		
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	,	
4	V •	S3 11 Cr. 605 RJS	
5	RANDY WASHINGTON, a/k/a Sealed Defendant 1,		
6	, Defendant		
7			
8		Λ	
9			
10		December 3, 2014 10:55 a.m.	
11		10.33 d.m.	
12			
13	Before:		
14	HON. RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,		
15		District Judge	
16			
17	APPEARANCES		
18			
19	PREET BHARARA,		
20	United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York		
21	TELEMACHUS PHILIP KASULIS, CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH DiMASE, Assistant United States Attorneys		
22	Assistant United St	ates Attorneys	
23	DAVID ANDREW GORDON, IRA LONDON, Attorneys for defendant Washington		
24			
25			

(In open court)

(Case called)

THE COURT: Good morning to you, Mr. Washington.

THE DEFENDANT: Good morning.

THE COURT: We are here for sentencing. We had a conference on Monday that was designed to address the issue of the government's offer. Mr. London was appointed before Thanksgiving to provide sort of a second opinion to Mr. Washington with respect to the government's offer, which was to basically withdraw or to dismiss the second 924 (c) count which has a 25-year-mandatory-consecutive sentence. Mr. Washington had indicated he was not inclined to take that offer because it involved a requirement that he waive certain appellate rights.

Nonetheless, I think I decided it couldn't hurt and might be useful to have another lawyer, Mr. London, appointed for the purpose of just conferring and consulting with Mr. Washington concerning this offer. So the purpose of Monday's conference was to see whether or not Mr. Washington wished to take the offer or not after having had a chance to consult with Mr. London.

I was advised on Monday by the Marshal's Service
Mr. Washington refused to come out of his cell, refused to come
to court. So I wanted to just first, now that Mr. Washington
is here, figure out what did happen on Monday, Mr. Gordon?

1	MR. GORDON: Mr. Washington advises he was ill.	
2	THE COURT: What was the nature of the illness?	
3	MR. GORDON: He was throwing up.	
4	THE COURT: All right. Okay. Look, if that is the	
5	case, Mr. Washington, if that is the case in the future, it is	
6	best to let your lawyers know if you can contact them.	
7	We had a conference on Monday in which we just	
8	discussed the offer. Mr. London represented to me that he had	
9	met with you and discussed with you the offer made by the	
10	government and that you were still not inclined to take that	
11	offer if it involved the waiving of certain appellate rights.	
12	I want to make sure that that is, in fact, your	
13	position. You had a chance to walk with Mr. London?	
14	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.	
15	THE COURT: Do you feel you had enough time to discuss	
16	with him	
17	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.	
18	THE COURT: this offer the government has made?	
19	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.	
20	THE COURT: Do you feel you now are comfortable making	
21	a decision with respect to that offer?	
22	THE DEFENDANT: No.	
23	THE COURT: Well, I don't think I asked the question	
24	well. So let me just say, have you reached a decision as to	
25	whether or not you want to take that offer?	

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I don't want to take it.

THE COURT: You do not want to take that offer?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Do you understand the government's offer involved them withdrawing or dismissing the second gun count that carries with it a 25-year-mandatory-consecutive sentence, and so if the government were to withdraw that or dismiss that conviction, then the maximum -- well, the mandatory sentence I would have to impose would be 25, but not more than 25. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: By turning down this deal, you understand that the government will then not dismiss the 25-year-mandatory consecutive count, which means the lowest that I can sentence you to is 50 years. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: I don't frankly wish to sentence you to 50 years. If left to my own devices, I wouldn't, but I will have no choice. I will have no choice but to impose a sentence of 50 years or at least 50 years as a result of your turning down this plea. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask the government, are there any other questions you would like me to ask
Mr. Washington?

MR. KASULIS: I don't think so. I have one point of clarification. When initially we had these discussions with Mr. Washington's counsel about our willingness to nolle, to dismiss the second consecutive 924 (c) count, we indicated that we expected the guidelines range for the remaining counts to match that in the PSR, leaving out the 25-year-consecutive penalty that would be eliminated in the proposed deal.

As we went back through the PSR to prepare for sentencing, we realized, of course, the two-level drug reduction across the board applies to Mr. Washington, so the guidelines range for the offer, although it wasn't a formal offer on paper, but the discussion is slightly off.

It still sounds like Mr. Washington does not want to take the deal which involves the dismissal of the 25-year-consecutive-mandatory penalty. I want to make that clear, the guidelines range would be slightly different.

THE COURT: We'll talk about the guidelines in a moment. It seems to me the mandatory minimums and consecutives are what are driving the sentences here.

MR. KASULIS: Yes.

THE COURT: And driving the determinations. Let me ask Mr. London or Mr. Gordon, is there anything else you would like me to ask Mr. Washington?

MR. LONDON: Not for me.

THE COURT: Mr. Gordon?

MR. GORDON: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me ask the government, I guess on Monday I asked the government to at least consider whether this was the right thing, as that term is very generally used, and so we had a somewhat lengthy discussion about the wisdom and justice of a sentence of 50 years on these facts. I asked the government to consider whether the waiver of appellate rights was really an essential component to its decision to dismiss the second 924 (c) count.

Mr. Kasulis?

MR. KASULIS: Again, your Honor, we went back and discussed this matter with people in the office above my level, the Chief of the Criminal Division, Deputy United States Attorney. Their view and ours, the government's view is that it is an important part of every, literally every negotiated resolution that my office does.

If Mr. Washington wants to take the position that those rights that he wants to keep, which he is obviously entitled to do, if he wants to take the position that those rights to him are worth not reducing his sentence by 25 years, we understand, but we don't want to get in a position of making an exception to the rule that every negotiated disposition we have involves the same agreement.

One of the provisions of that agreement is the forfeiture of appellate rights. As your Honor knows, it is not

even a forfeiture of appellate rights with regard to ineffective assistance of counsel. That is not carved out.

THE COURT: You're not carving it out. It is not a waivable right.

MR. KASULIS: I don't want to make it sound like the government's largess. If this is the concern he has or had in the past, he would be able to make that claim on appeal or on collateral attack. It is the balance of whatever appellate rights and collateral attack rights he is interested in pursuing he is deciding is worth the 25-year risk.

THE COURT: Right. You are also deciding that it is worth it to have Mr. Washington spend an extra 25 years in jail rather than alter a policy that normally has people waiving appellate rights as part of a plea agreement. The normal policy is not to dismiss counts of conviction after a trial. The decision to do that was based on the somewhat unusual circumstances of what appears to be an unjust or certainly overly long sentence given the conduct here and given what the original plea offer was.

So it would seem to me, not that I am in a position to tell you what to do, but it would seem to me this rigid adherence to policy is not terribly persuasive in a situation that is unique enough to prompt the office to alter its usual policy with respect to post-conviction relief?

MR. KASULIS: As you can imagine, we see it slightly

differently. We are actually abandoning our standards policy of respecting jury verdicts in order to make this offer to him in the first place.

THE COURT: That is because there is a conclusion that a 50-year sentence is unwarranted, and that is a conclusion prosecutors should make, and get to make, frankly have an obligation to make. It was a decision that was made early on when you decided that a 10-year offer was appropriate in light of the conduct.

So, look, we have been over this a couple of times, but I'm not sure that there's great consistency in the position that says we agree that 50 years is too long, but it is only too long if you give up your appellate rights.

MR. KASULIS: That is sort of what we do in every plea disposition in the first place. We offer someone what we believe is a reasonable offer, with the understanding if they go to trial, the sentencing exposure will be much more severe customarily, and as a part of that plea agreement in every other case, we require the defendant to forfeit his appellate rights.

THE COURT: You should talk to the Attorney General on this. I can't imagine so great is the policy enunciated with respect to prior felony informations is completely distinct and divorced from a policy that would require somebody to do 50 years because they didn't take a plea deal, or they wouldn't

waive appellate rights.

There is a tension there. I would love to ask the Attorney General if I get an opportunity, but I can't imagine that he would say no, no, I am fine with that because although 851s trouble me, stacking 924 (c)s to punish people for going to trial and not waiving appellate rights is hunky-dory. That doesn't seem to jibe.

MR. KASULIS: I hear what you're saying completely.

It has been clear from the Attorney General's memoranda addressing these issues that at least so far -- and it might change -- he is distinguishing quite clearly drug conduct from violent conduct. This is a defendant who engaged in multiple armed robberies pistol-whipped victims, trafficked in AK-47s in addition to drug conduct.

THE COURT: Don't get me wrong, I get that.

You offered him 10 years for that, and so I think the question you ought to be asking the Attorney General is having offered 10 before trial, are you okay with us requiring 50 when he wouldn't take the deal and 50 because he won't waive certain appellate rights? Is that in line with the philosophy that seems to be underlying his position on 851, prior felony informations? It seems to me not.

Should I adjourn sentencing and ask you to ask him? I don't know that I can or should do that. My hunch is he is soon to be the ex-Attorney General and he won't look with pride

on what you guys are doing today.

MR. KASULIS: All I can say is we followed to the best of our ability the Attorney General's memoranda which addressed the drug laws. We have the nolle for the prior felony information here for your Honor's consideration, as we said we would on Monday.

The Attorney General has not addressed violent conduct like this. In his memoranda on drug conduct, he said we shouldn't even consider going down from a (b)(1)(A) to (b)(1)(B) in the drug context when someone's conduct touches upon violence. Mr. Washington's conduct here really is violent conduct.

THE COURT: I get that. There is no way I will give him 10. You offered him 10. There is no way I would have given him that. I don't know what you guys were thinking. I wouldn't have given him that as the sentencing judge.

You offered him 10. Having offered him 10, and having him turn it down, and you then decided that 50 was the right mandatory sentence, I just think that is inconsistent with the Attorney General's position. It is not that you had to offer him that. Having offered that, it seems that the 50 is really designed to punish going to trial. It is not designed to punish conduct that is really bad conduct, but you didn't think it needed to be punished with more than 10.

MR. KASULIS: I would have to disagree again.

The 10-year offer, as your Honor knows, arises out of a variety of considerations. One is, of course, the conduct. That is the most important aspect of the calculus that leads to the offer. Another is the assessment of the trial risk. This became a case with only a single cooperator essentially putting Mr. Washington --

THE COURT: Don't! This is was an incredibly strong case. The defendant was on tape talking openly about his drug activity on a phone that he knew was monitored from Rikers Island. There was strong evidence in this case.

He has a right to go to trial, and maybe

Mr. Washington hoped or believed that the cooperator would not

be believed and that the jury would have trouble on at least

some of the counts. I don't know. There are a lot of reasons

why people go to trial.

It is hard for me to believe that you thought you had 40 years worth of risk that made a 10-year deal a good one, but that otherwise 50 years is what justice would have required. The disparity is too great. It is one thing to say we offered him 10 before trial because there was risk, but having gone to trial, he has to take his lumps and do 20, that is something that wouldn't phase me.

When it goes all the way to 50, that is really kind of shocking.

MR. KASULIS: I understand your Honor's concern which

is why, as you know, we have tried to create this package for Mr. Washington that would allow it to come down to 25. It is just we are trying to treat Mr. Washington as we would every other defendant who is engaged in a negotiated disposition in this case, and he is not willing to do it.

THE COURT: You haven't tried him like every other defendant in part or primarily because you have recognized this is a case that is unlike most other cases. To your credit, I think that this is a case where a 50-year sentence would be unjust. I think a 40-year sentence would also be unjust, although less unjust.

MR. KASULIS: I can tell your Honor the precedential value of attempting to or willing to dismiss the second consecutive 924 (c), we knew that would have consequences, and it is already starting to, as you can imagine. Defense attorneys are e-mailing the office and saying we want the Randy Washington deal, we want you guys --

THE COURT: This is not happening in a vacuum. Judge Gleason has written on this in several cases eloquently and spoken on this subject. There are other districts around the country where there is a recognition of the stacking of gun counts without intervening arrests or convictions can result in incredibly Draconian sentences that are at least in many cases unjust. There is nothing wrong with saying that, taking that long view of things. Prosecutors should be commended for doing

that. The fact that other people may say I want you to take a look at the second 924 (c), yes, second 924 (c), you know, big deal.

MR. KASULIS: I agree.

THE COURT: That doesn't strike me as a terribly onerous burden on the government as a result of this plea offer.

MR. KASULIS: I agree. That is not what I was trying to say. The second point against that backdrop, if we went further with Mr. Washington and said in addition to being willing to not drop the 924 (c) count, we are not going to make you use the same plea agreement we use in every other case, that, too, will --

THE COURT: There are cases in which you forego a 924 (c), you forego a prior felony information for someone who doesn't even plea to a plea agreement. There are cases where that happens. I have seen them. I think it is inaccurate to say everybody has to take this deal or the world will end as we know it. Different cases require different adjustments and different responses.

This strikes me as a rare case in which the mandatory sentence is something that is beyond what is appropriate given the particular circumstances of this case. Mr. Washington, his youth, you know, the sentence that is going to be imposed in any event, it is not like I was going to give him two and the

government had to carry something. I am not a push-over when it comes to these things. I am generally considered to be a reasonably tough sentencer when the facts warrant it.

As I said, I can't imagine I was ever going to sentence Mr. Washington for less than 20 years for the conduct he engaged in.

MR. KASULIS: Your Honor well knows to the extent this became a precedent, we are willing to nolle after a trial, a guilty finding, dismiss the 924 (c) and not require the defendant to enter into the standard form plea agreement, this will occur in front of all the other judges in the Southern District.

I take your Honor's point about your own sentencing practices typically. As your Honor knows, there is a wide variety of sentencing practices in the Southern District, and our office has to be mindful of that.

THE COURT: I don't think either of us is going to persuade the other. I don't know that I have the authority to tell you to bring this up to the Attorney General. This has been raised to the U.S. Attorney who is a presidentially-appointed officer. I think there is only so much I can do. Mr. Gordon, Mr. London, is there anything else you would like to say?

MR. GORDON: Your Honor, I know that Mr. Washington is anxious to be sentenced. If there is any chance the government

would take it another level up to the Attorney General, I would think hopefully the Attorney General is as reasonable as you are and more reasonable than the government is being and would see that this is just too much. I would have no objection and actually request a brief adjournment if they would do that. I know Mr. Washington wants to get on with this case.

With respect to his refusal to accept the government's offer, as I said before, I know your Honor is not going to revisit it, but it is my view that given the chances at trial, given what the original offer was, the only way he was going to do better than that offer was to win every count, was to win the entire case. That would seem so unlikely that his refusal to accept the offer then, his refusal to accept this now would be based upon some hope that he could win on appeal and get a new trial.

I think that is again unrealistic or that maybe get a new trial, but the hope he would do better at a new trial seems to me totally unrealistic and is based upon his cognitive impairment, which I know and I think that further psychological evaluation and a hearing might very well determine that he was not, he was not competent and is still not competent.

THE COURT: All right. You have drifted into a different point, which is something I have already ruled on, and I am pretty confident in my ruling with respect to Mr. Washington's competence.

We can question his judgment, but I don't think that is the same as questioning his competence. I have already ruled on that. I think the issue is whether or not I can or should direct the government to raise this to a cabinet level official, the Attorney General of the United States. I don't think I have the authority to order them to do that.

I suppose I could ask them to consider it on these unique circumstances, but that might be something they can handle with a phone call because I don't think Mr. Kasulis, notwithstanding his lofty position now as a unit chief, gets to make these calls for his office.

MR. KASULIS: I do not have a hotline to the Attorney General. If Mr. Washington is asking us to do that, and your Honor is interested in our trying to explore that, we can try to do it. I want to make sure Mr. Washington gets as much process as he can. I don't want to be the limiting factor.

THE COURT: Let's do this. Mr. Washington, I know you wish to be sentenced today. That has been conveyed to me. Is that accurate? You want to be sentenced today; is that right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: I am inclined to very respectfully ask the government to at least inquire as to whether they're willing to bring this to the attention of the Attorney General or other responsible involved in his policymaking with respect to 851 prior felony informations, to see if there is a tension between

that policy and the position being taken in this case. I say that with some hesitation because I don't think judges can or should be directing prosecutors to just go all the way up a chain. If that were the case, then the entire system could grind to a halt. I think this is a case that is unique or rare in my experience and it is one that we spent a lot of time thinking about.

The extra time for a phone call or two is probably not going to kill us. Mr. Gordon, did you want to say something?

MR. GORDON: If it turns out they can't make that decision quickly enough or not reach the Attorney General, if the matter were adjourned briefly, I would have 14 days from the date the judgment is filed to file my notice of appeal. I will file it sooner than that, so there is no prejudice to Mr. Washington by any delay.

THE COURT: Why don't we do this. You talk to Mr. Washington about the potential consequences of a short adjournment. The government can make a call or two to see if there is any even prospect or possibility of an adjournment for taking this higher, and then we'll reconvene in about 10 minutes, okay? If the government needs to make a call here, they can, but you all have phones so you can. If you want to use the jury room, you can do that, too.

(Recess).

THE COURT: Have a seat. We took a short adjournment

so that the lawyers could confer with their respective clients and/or supervisors. So what did we learn?

MR. KASULIS: During the adjournment I spoke on the phone with the Chief of the Criminal Division, the Deputy U.S. Attorney and the U.S. Attorney about this situation. I explained what had happened this morning and your Honor's request for better term.

They said that it might make sense in an effort to try to find a disposition in this case that will allow the court to sentence Mr. Washington with only a 25-year-mandatory-minimum sentence, to ask Mr. Washington -- not you -- but to find out from Mr. Washington, through counsel, which issues in particular he is interested in pressing on appeal before the Second Circuit.

Then if we get that information, we can internally determine whether we would be comfortable with carving out those issues from our normal appellate waiver. They're just concerned about a blanket appellate waiver where the kind of frivolous argument can be made. If there are particular arguments Mr. Washington wants to make, we can consider carving that out. Under those circumstances, Mr. Washington might be willing to sign a post-plea sentencing disposition agreement which would allow us to nolle the 924 (c).

THE COURT: All right. So that may take a little bit of time?

MR. KASULIS: We spoke about this potentiality with Mr. Gordon and Mr. London right before your Honor took the Bench. They were trying to think through some issues, but obviously they need to speak about it with their client. They probably also have to potentially review the record or speak to Mr. Freeman since neither of these gentlemen tried the case and have not spent long enough with the record to make that determination on the fly.

THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Gordon to make sure he has conferred with his client about this and his client is on board.

MR. GORDON: I understand he is willing to have the sentence adjourned. I think probably a week would be enough.

Again if we can't work something out, I would file a notice of appeal more quickly than I might otherwise file,.

THE COURT: That is to allay Mr. Washington's concerns of --

MR. GORDON: Right.

THE COURT: Mr. Washington, if we put this over a week, you're okay with that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: That seems to me to make sense. I will say this. Look, each of us has an obligation to seek to do justice. We're not unconstrained in that regard. Each of us has different institutional and legal obligations and

restraints that sometimes limit our ability to do that, but we each have to try to do justice as we understand the term within the confines of our institutional roles.

It is true of defense lawyers, prosecutors and judges, so I think it is a good thing that we'll try to discuss this a little longer that people are at least open to considering ways toward what would ultimately be a just or more just sentence.

So I commend the government for at least considering this, and I ask Mr. Washington and his lawyers to think carefully about how you want to proceed and what is most important to Mr. Washington going forward. That being said, it is Mr. Washington's call ultimately whether and what he wants to do on this.

MR. GORDON: Yes, your Honor. I would hope that during this week the government would consider your suggestion that they try to speak to Mr. Holder also.

THE COURT: Look, the reality is there are good people in the U.S. Attorney's Office. They understand Mr. Holder's policies and the reasons for them better than I do. I think they, I am sure, are reluctant to be running things up to the Attorney General every time a judge or a defendant or his lawyer are not happy with the result of the decision-making process within the U.S. Attorney's Office.

I am not suggesting, I am not ordering, I am not demanding that this go to Mr. Holder. I asked the government

to consider whether there really is a tension between Mr. Holder's stated positions and the positions being articulated today with respect to the District's policy with respect to the waiver of appellate rights. It seems to me there was a tension.

It is the kind of thing I am sure reasonable people can disagree about. Look, if the government wants to do that, they can. I am not ordering them to do it or requesting any more than what I have said. I have said a lot in this case, and it is simply because I take my role seriously, as I know all of you do, too. That is the most that I am prepared to ask is that everybody really think long and hard about what role they play in this process and what would be a just sentence within the confines in which we work, which is Congressionally passed and Presidentially signed statutes and mandatory minimums and everything else we have been talking about for months and years.

So think about it. Let me know where we're at, but I'll pick a date for sentencing next week.

MR. GORDON: Would the 12th be possible? I will have to confer with Mr. Freeman.

THE COURT: We probably could do the 12th, at 2:00 o'clock, I think.

THE CLERK: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. 2:00 o'clock on Friday,

1 December 12th.

MR. KASULIS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Washington, that is okay with you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: It is a little more than a week, but there are a number of things that need to happen before then. So let's plan on December 12th, at 2:00 o'clock, and then that will be it. That will be it.

MR. LONDON: I asked Mr. Washington if he wanted me to continue, and he said yes.

THE COURT: All right, so you'll continue. That date works for you as well, Mr. London?

MR. LONDON: It does.

THE COURT: Good.

(Off-the-record discussion)

THE COURT: All right. Thanks, everybody. I am sorry that this is getting delayed further, but I think in the long run an extra week or so is a small price to pay for some additional time to consider what is a difficult case. It is a difficult set of facts and circumstances and it is obviously an important case for Mr. Washington and for the government. I get that. All right. Thanks. Thank you to the Court Reporter and the Marshals as well.

(Court adjourned)